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A RESPONSE TO DOUGLAS J. FEITH'S
LA W IN THE SER VICE OF TERROR - THE STRANGE CASE




In the article mentioned in the title, Douglas J. Feith, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Negotiation, characterizes the 1977
Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions' as a "pro-terrorist trea-
ty masquerading as humanitarian law."2
He bases his vigorous objections to the most recent treaty codifying and
developing international humanitarian law applicable in international armed
conflicts,3 on two provisions of Protocol I regarding:
(1) The application of international armed conflicts rules to certain se-
verely limited armed struggles for self determination (Article 1(4));
and
(2) A revision of the standards under which members of irregular armed
groups of a Party to an international armed conflict (guerrillas) may
qualify as combatants and be entitled to be prisoners of war. The
relaxation of these standards are described as greatly endangering the
safety of civilians while they legitimize the acts of terrorists in disguis-
ing themselves as civilians (Articles 43 and 44).
Apparently, Mr. Feith's views have had decisive influence on the formu-
lation of U.S. Government policy regarding the ratification of the 1977 Pro-
tocols. Recently the administration announced that Protocol II4 would be ac-
*Adjunct Professor of Law/Senior Fellow Washington College of Law Institute, The American University;
Member of the U.S. Delegation to the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian International
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts; former Chief, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Ad-
vocate General of the Army.
'In 1977 a Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Government adopted two protocols updating the
law of armed conflicts in armed conflicts. Mr. Feith vehemently objects to the first protocol dealing with in-
ternational armed conflicts. The second dealing with non-international armed conflicts is considered accept-
able by him. The two protocols are: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), [hereinafter cited as Protocol 11;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) [hereinafter cited as Protocol Ill. The text of the two Protocols is
reprinted in U.N. General Assembly Doc. A/32/144, Anns. I and II, 15 Aug. 1977; International Review of
the Red Cross No. 197-198, August-Sept. 1977; 16 Int'l Legal Materials 1391 and 1442 (1977); D.
SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 551, 619 (1981).
'Feith, Law in the Service of Terror - the Strange Case of Additional Protocol I, I The National Interest
36, 47 (1985).
'Protocol I, supra note 1.
4Supra note i.
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ceptable, but that ratification of Protocol I would be unacceptable because it:
".... suffered from fundamental shortcomings that could not be remedied
through reservations and understandings. In particular some key provi-
sions of Protocol I, such as Article 1(4), risk introducing political elements
into humanitarian law of armed conflict by making its applicability hinge
on non-legal standards stated in highly charged rhetoric. These provisions
also risk affording legal protection to terrorists and 'national liberation
movements' at the expense of the civilian population, and would erase the
traditional line between international and non-international armed con-
flicts.",
Referring to the relaxation of standards for distinguishing guerrillas from
the civilian population, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger recently
stated: "The protocol provides that combatants need not distinguish
themselves from civilians until the actual point of armed engagement. .. "6 If it
were so it were a grievous fault.
Like Mr. Feith, the Secretary of Defense appears to rely on bizarre inter-
pretive statements made at the Diplomatic Conference by only the PLO and
Quatar, while disregarding the contrary interpretive declarations expressed by
the U.S. and the United Kingdom at the time they signed the Protocol, by
many other states during the Conference, and by such allies as Belgium, Italy
and the Republic of Korea in their instruments of Ratification
It is indeed regrettable that important policy level officials of the U.S.
Government support the PLO's interpretation of critical provisions of Protocol
I which may someday be cited as supporting claims of terrorists and war
criminals for legitimacy. The tactic of advancing the worst possible interpreta-
tion of treaty provisions in order to defeat their ratification may provide a per-
suasive precedent for those claiming that interpretation in the future. In this
case, it constitutes a grave disservice to our allies who have expressed contrary
declarations when they ratified the Protocol. It would be tragic, if Mr. Feith's
concept of its bias in favor of terrorism were to affect the application of the
Protocol among its Parties.
The security of the civilian population in an international armed conflict
does not hinge solely on the extent to which irregular combatants distinguish
themselves from the civilian population. Protocol I not only updates the so-
called "Law of Geneva" - the 1949 Geneva Conventions which protect the
wounded, sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war, and civilians in the power of a
'Letter to Senator Trible from Hon. James W. Dyer, Acting Asst. Secretary of State for Legislative and In-
tergovernmental Affairs, dated June 3, 1986; Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 Foreign Affairs 901, 912-15
(1986).
6Statement of Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger before the ABA National Conference on Law in
Relation to Terrorism, June 5, 1986, 8 ABA Law and National Security Intelligence Report 9, (July 1986).
'See notes 58-60 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20:2
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss2/3
A RESPONSETO DOUGLAS J. FEITH
Party to the Conflict of which they are not nationals,8 but also the "Law of
The Hague" - the rules relevant to the conduct of hostilities which were
deemed, in 1949, to be beyond the scope of the Geneva Convention system.
The dismal history of 20th Century wars bears witness that infinitely more
civilians have lost their lives in indiscriminate bombardments than by the
failure of guerrillas to distinguish themselves.
Nevertheless, Protocol I also updates the Hague rules regulating the con-
duct of hostilities including methods and means of warfare, the status of com-
batants, and the measures for preventing or minimizing civilian casualties and
damage to civilian property from the effects of hostilities. These rules had not
been updated since they were last codified in 1907,1 notwithstanding their ob-
solescence and inadequacy demonstrated in two world wars and numerous
other armed conflicts. Their failure to regulate the hostile use of air power and
long range weaponry shattered the illusion, prevalent in 1907, that the civilian
population outside the immediate land combat zone was relatively secure.
While the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was putting the finishing touches
on the four Geneva Conventions, the United Nations International Law Com-
mission was asked to undertake a project to codify the law dealing with the
conduct of hostilities. It declined the task for the reason that ". . . war having
been outlawed the regulation of its conduct has ceased to be relevant."'" Thus,
the U.N. bowed out of this effort.
Because of the default of the U.N. organization to undertake the task of
updating the Law of the Hague, the International Red Cross assumed the
work of preparing Draft Rules for the Protection of the Civilian Population
Against the Dangers of Hostilities." By 1968, the U.N. General Assembly con-
'Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as First
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as Second Geneva Conventionl; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
cited as Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter cited as Fourth
Geneva Convention].
'Hague Convention (IV) of 18 October 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Arts.
21-41, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539; reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note I, at 63-68; Annex
thereto, embodying the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat 2295, T.S.
539, reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN. supra note 1, at 69-87 (hereinafter cited as Hague Regulations]
Hague Convention No. IX of 18 October 1907, Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces, 36 Stat 351,
T.S. 542, reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN supra at 723-727.
'*Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of the First Session,
1949 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm 281. The I.L.C. apparently confused the international law relevant to the resort to
armed coercion (jus ad bellum) with the rules relevant to rights and obligations in the conduct of hostilities
and the treatment of victims (jus in bello). The Nuremberg Tribunals were emphatic in holding that thejus
in bello must be applied equally without regard to the legality or illegality of the recourse to armed force.
(U.S. v. List et. al. (The Hostage Case), XI Trial of War Criminals 1243-44, 1246-1248, 1272 (1950).
" ICRC, Draft Rulesfor the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred By the Civilian Population in Time of War
(2d ed) (1958). Reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN. supra note 1, at 187-193.
Fall, 19861
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sidered that there was "a need for additional humanitarian conventions or
other appropriate instruments to ensure better protection of civilians, prisoners
of war and combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limita-
tions of the use of certain methods and means of warfare's. . ." The necessary
studies were to be conducted in consultation with the ICRC.12
The underlying implication was that if the ICRC efforts were to fail, the
work would be undertaken in the more politicized U.N. forum. Thus
stimulated and encouraged, the ICRC's preparatory work resulted in the sub-
mission of two draft protocols which formed the negotiating texts for a
Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Government in 1974. After
four annual sessions attended by 135 states (and eleven liberation movements
observers, entitled to speak, but not to vote), the Conference adopted the two
protocols on June 10, 1977.'1
It would appear that the Military Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have problems with provisions of Protocol I dealing with methods and means
of warfare and with rules and precautions to be taken by attacking forces and
defending forces dealing with the protection of the civilian population against
the effects of hostilities, prescribed in Protocol I. The relevant provisions im-
pose extensive duties on military commanders to ensure that objects of attack
are military objectives and to avoid or minimize collateral damage to civilians
and to civilian objects. 4
2UNGA Resolution 2444 Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts (19 Dec 1968). Reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note I at 199-200. The resolution also affirmed resolution XXVIII of the XXth
International Conference of the Red Cross (Vienna 1965) which laid down the following principles for obser-
vance by all governments and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts:
(a) That the rights of the parties to a conflict to adopt means for injuring the enemy is not unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such;
(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and
members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.
"Supra note 1. The Protocols entered into force on December 7, 1978. As of November 1986, 59 states will
be Parties to Protocol I (international armed conflicts) and 52 to Protocol II (non-international). The Peoples
Republic of China is the only permanent member of the Security Council to be a party to both Protocols.
France is a party to Protocol 11 only and is the only state to be a party to Protocol 11 without also being a
party to Protocol I. Angola, Cuba, Cyprus, Mexico, Mozambique, Syria, Vietnam and Zaire are parties to
Protocol 1, but not to Protocol I1. (250 Int'l Review of the Red Cross 72-73, Jan-Feb 1986; 123 ICRC
Bulletin 4 (Apr 1986; 125 Bulletin 4 (June 1986); 126 Bulletin 3 (July 1986).
Although the United States and most of its NATO and Pacific Allies signed both Protocols, the only
NATO members to have ratified Protocol I are Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Norway. The Republic of
Korea with which the United States has a Mutual Assistance Treaty and on whose territory substantial U.S.
combat forces are stationed under a Combined Military Command, has also ratified both Protocols. (Id. Int'l
Review supra).
"The presumption in Art. 50(1) that "in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be con-
sidered to be a civilian"; the rule of proportionality governing the expectation of incidental civilian casualties
or damage to civilian property "which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad-
vantage anticipated" (Arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii); the provision of Art. 52(2) which defines military objective
in terms of a determination that the object is one "which by their nature, location, purpose or use makes an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage"; the presumption that "an object
which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes is not being used to make an effective contribution to
military action" (Art. 52(3); the derogations stated in Art. 53(3)(b) relative objects used to support military
action; the determination that attacks on military objectives near dams, dykes, and nuclear electric
[Vol. 20:2
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In the final analysis, the implementation of these provisions must be made
on the basis of subjective determinations made by commanders on the basis of
information reasonably available to them at the time of decision. Sometimes
that information is mistaken. Command decisions have to be made in the fog
of battle under circumstances when clinical certainty is impossible and when
the adversary is striving to conceal the true facts in order to deceive and to con-
fuse.
These provisions were closely scrutinized by the military services and by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as by the ministries of Defense of our allies.
They were found to be acceptable subject to certain declarations and
understandings, some of which may be regarded as reservations. Among these
understandings was a declaration to the effect that the actions of commanders
and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or executing attacks must
be based on the state of facts as they appeared to the officer at the time he
acted and not on the basis of hindsight. Some of these declarations were made
by the United Kingdom and the U.S. at time of signature, 5 by Belgium, Italy
and Korea at the time of ratification,'" while others were expressed formally
during the course of the conference with respect to Articles 35-60 of Protocol
I." Despite these concerns, which were well recognized and uppermost in the
minds of the Military Services and military representatives of U.S. and Allied
delegations during the negotiations, there has been virtually no public
disclosure in the American media as to these problems or the declarations and
reservations necessary to solve them consistent with the demands of military
necessity.'8 Instead, the concerns of the Department of Defense, as disclosed in
official statements and in the media, have been limited to those expressed, or
inspired, by Mr. Feith, concerning wars of national liberation and the new
standards for qualification as combatants and their entitlement to be prisoners
generating stations will not cause the release of dangerous forces (Art. 56); the determination of feasibility in
relation to precautions in attacks and against the effects of attacks (Arts. 57-58).
I'D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN. supra note I, at 634-636.
"Embassy of Belgium, Berne, Instrument of Ratification with Interpretive Declarations deposited with the
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 20 May 1986, to become effective 20 November 1986; Reprinted in
252 Int'l R. of the Red Cross 172-175 (May-June 1986); Embassy of Italy, Berne. Instrument of Ratification
with Declarations deposited with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. February 27, 1986, to become
effective August 27, 1986; Berne. Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Instrument of Ratification. Jan. 15,
1982.
"BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF. NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS - COMMENTARY ON THE Two
1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 189-91, (1982); 224 (footnote 19); 253
(footnote 28); 254 (footnote 29, 1982); 255 (footnote 34); 280 (footnotes 32, 33); 307 (footnote 25); 333 (foot-
note 18); 359, 362 (footnote 8); 365 (footnote 18); 371, 373 (footnote 7).
"But see Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol ,
26 Virginia J. of Int'l L. 109-76 (1985). In addition to criticizing the same provisions to which Mr. Feith ob-
jects, Major Roberts sets forth many criticisms of other provisions of Protocol I. Whether these objections
reflect those of the military services and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not known. His objections are
answered in detail by Ambassador Aldrich, head of the U.S. Delegation of the Diplomatic Conference that
adopted the 1977 Protocols. (Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Laws of War. A Reply to Criticisms
of the 1977 Geneva Protocols; 26 Virginia J. of Int'l L 693 (1986).
Fall, 19861
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of war. 9
In this article, I expect to examine and strip away the emotional rhetoric
which characterizes Mr. Feith's stated objections in order to place the provi-
sions to which he objects in their true perspective, in the hope that public at-
tention may then focus on the more important problems of the protocol's
measures for protecting the civilian population against attack and the in-
discriminate effects of attacks and to begin a debate as to whether these
measures of the protocol are militarily feasible.
THE ALLEGATION THAT PROTOCOL I Is A PRO-TERRORIST TREATY
While introducing a panel at a conference on International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law in Non-international Armed Conflicts, Professor
John F. Murphy pointed out that terrorism may occur in the context of inter-
national armed conflict, non-international armed conflict or in time of peace.2"
At the outset, it must be understood that Protocol I is not relevant to acts
of terrorism committed in situations short of international armed conflicts. It
does not apply to internal rebellions and insurgencies, and it certainly does not
apply to situations of internal tensions and disorders.2'
In the context of an international armed conflict or a belligerent occupa-
tion, the 1949 Geneva Conventions as supplemented by Protocol I, prohibits
all acts usually associated with terrorism under all circumstances, whether
committed by regular or irregular combatants. Breaches of the norms pro-
hibiting such acts are punishable by penal sanctions.2 Those classified as
"grave breaches," such as murders, torture, summary executions, inhumane
treatment, taking hostages, making civilians the object of attack and spreading
terror among them, and indiscriminate attacks involving disproportionate
civilian casualties,23 are made universal crimes under the jurisdiction of all Par-
ties to the relevant Convention or Protocol. The Party having control over an
alleged offender is obliged to either prosecute him or extradite him to a re-
questing State that has made out a prima facie case.14
However one defines "terrorism" in other contexts, within the context of
the Geneva Conventions, any violent act prohibited by the Conventions or
Protocol I committed against persons or against property which affects the life
"Feith, supra note 2; L.H. Gelb. War Law Faces Objection of Joint Chiefs, New York Times, 22 July 1985
at I, A7; W. Safire, Rights for Terrorists? A 1977 Treaty Would Grant Them, New York Times, Op. Ed.
Nov. 15, 1985.
Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-international Armed Conflicts Under Domestic Law and Transna-
tionalPractice, 33 Am. U.L. Rev. 53 (1983).
"tGeneva Conventions, supra note 8, Art 2 Common to the Conventions; Protocol 1, supra note I Article
1(3) and (4).
221d at Common Articles 49/50/129/146; Protocol I, Art 85.
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or health of persons is an act of terrorism.
In the unlikely event that any liberation movement should qualify as a
Party to an international armed conflict, the movement would be under the
same obligations to repress grave breaches and to suppress ordinary breaches.
Its guerrillas would be subject to the same sanctions on a universal basis."
The comprehensive extent to which Protocol I prohibits virtually all
violent acts committed by terrorists, making the more serious breaches univer-
sal crimes subject to the jurisdiction of all Parties can hardly be said to be a
''pro-terrorist" treaty.
The Combatants' Privilege and Prisoner of War Status
Mr. Feith dismisses the substantive norms, the penal sanctions, and other
enforcement measures as insignificant:
...One can find phrases and even whole sentences in Protocol I that
repudiate bald terrorism and deprecate attacks on civilians, but they are
not the gist of the operative provisions. They are a faint counterpoint to
the booming "progressive," collective, ends-justify the means blare of the
innovative elements of the document .... 26
Presumably this colorful rhetoric is intended to refer to the relaxation of
the standards by which guerrillas may qualify for the combatants' privileges
and entitlement to be prisoners of war if captured in occupied territory (where
the new rules are likely to become applicable) and in struggles for self deter-
mination (where their applicability is doubtful).
Mr. Feith's apparent assumptions are that the combatants' privilege and
prisoner-of-war status provides immunity from prosecution by captors for ter-
rorist acts such as direct attacks against the civilian population or in-
discriminate attacks affecting them. It does not.
In international armed conflicts, those who are entitled to the status of
"privileged combatants" are immune from criminal prosecution by their cap-
tors for only those warlike acts that do not violate the laws and customs of
war, but might otherwise be common crimes under municipal law.27
The privilege was also recognized in Article 57 of the Lieber Instructions
of 1863, which states that "[slo soon as a man is armed by a sovereign govern-
"Protocol 1, supra note 1, Arts. 80, 85, 86, 87, 91, 96(3).
16Feith, supra note I at 47.
11H. GROTIUS. COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 42, 45, 68, 81 (G. Williams trans. 1604),
reprinted in 22 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I (J. Scott ed. 1950); S. PUFENDORF. ON THE LAW OF
NATURE AND NATIONS 1307, 1309 (C. Oldfather & W. Oldfather trans. 1688), reprinted in 17 THE CLASSICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I (J. Scott ed. 1934); E. DE VATTEL. THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF
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ment and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing,
wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses."' , Under
the laws of the United States, any killing by a privileged combatant during
combat operations that does not violate the laws of war is recognized to be a
justifiable homicide. 9
Civilians who participate directly in hostilities, as well as spies and
members of the armed forces who forfeit their combatant status do not enjoy
that privilege and may be tried, under appropriate safeguards, for direct par-
ticipation in hostilities as well as for any act made criminal under municipal
law which they might have committed.' It is readily understandable that the
relaxation of the standards for qualification of privileged combatants was a
high priority goal of those governments and authorities who employ guerrilla
warfare in furtherance of their political objectives.
The nature of the combatants' privilege also demonstrates why the obliga-
tion to extend the combatant's privilege and prisoner of war status is strictly
limited to international armed conflicts. Governments are reluctant to assume
treaty obligations which require them to extend a license to domestic enemies
to commit acts of violence against their security personnel and those objects
which could be described as military objectives.
The real issue addressed by Mr. Feith is whether the new rules of the Pro-
tocol affecting the maintenance of the distinction between combatants and
civilians are so relaxed as to permit guerrillas to use disguise as civilians as a
means for achieving surprise in attacks against their enemy's military person-
nel or against objects which are legitimate military objectives. If they do, the
innocent civilians would soon lose the benefit of the presumption that ap-
parently unarmed persons in civilian dress do not attack. The result of under-
mining or eliminating this presumption is bound to have unhappy conse-
quences for the civilian population.3'
Mr. Feith's objection to the negotiating record is that the Western Delega-
tions sacrificed their principle of the application of neutral law in the regula-
tion of armed conflict to the political considerations of the Third World and
Socialist majority in order to achieve a consensus.
2 U.S. Dept. of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (General
Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863) (Lieber Instructions), reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN supra note 1, at
3, 11 [hereinafter cited as Lieber Instructions).
"
9U.S. Dept. of Defense, Manual for Courts-Martial United States § 197(b), at 351 (1951); Arce v. State, 83
Tex. Crim. 292, 202 S.W. 951 (1918) (soldiers who kill enemy during fire fight in undeclared state of war
cannot be convicted of criminal homicide).
'Baxter, So-called "Unprivileged Belligerency"" Spies, Guerrillas, Saboteurs, 28 B.Y.I.L. 353 (1951).
"Press release. Delegation of Sweden, ICRC Conf. Govt Experts, Geneva. 15 May 1972, reprinted in
BOTHE. PARTSCH & SOLF. supra note 17 at 254.
[Vol. 20:2
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THE ALLEGATION THAT NON-LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTED THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW RULES
The development of humanitarian law - whether by Diplomatic Con-
ferences or by the slow process of custom - is a legislative process involving
competing claims and counter claims in furtherance of the competing parties'
national interests which ultimately result in a rule which meets the minimum
requirements of the competing parties. The history of the rules concerning the
qualification of combatant status and entitlement to be a prisoner of war has
been a controversial subject at all lawmaking conferences, and has always
resulted in compromise.
Historically, nations which view themselves as likely victims of aggression
and enemy occupation have argued that guerrillas, partisans and members of
resistance movements should be regarded as patriots and privileged com-
batants, while major military powers have argued that only regular, uniformed
and disciplined combatants who distinguish themselves clearly from the
civilian population should have the right to participate directly in hostilities.
National attitudes on this issue were subject to change and role reversals
with altered circumstances."
Although the thirteen American colonies relied heavily on such part-time
combatants such as the "minute men" and Marion the Swamp Fox during our
Revolutionary War,33 the attitude of the Union during the Civil War toward ir-
regular part-time combatants was one of harsh repression.", The circumstances
were different, with some notable exceptions, Union forces operated in the
South among an unfriendly population.
In 1874, upon the initiative of the Czar of Russia, the delegations of fif-
teen European states met in Brussels to examine a project for the codification
of the Laws and Customs of War submitted by the Russian Government. The
Russian draft was largely based on the principles stated in the Lieber instruc-
"
2During the peace negotiations at the end of the Franco-Prussian war, Favre complained to Bismarck that
the Germans had acted with unreasonable severity against French partisans since they, the Germans, had
engaged in partisan activities against the French in 1813. Bismarck responded that indeed the Germans had
done so, and that the trees of Prussia still bore the marks of the ropes with which the French hanged them
(G. Best, "Restraint, on War by Land Before 1945" in M. Howard, (ed.) RESTRAINT ON WAR 32-33 (1979).
"1R.B. ASPREY, WAR IN THE SHADOWS, THE GUERRILLA IN HISTORY, 97-117 (1975); W. LAQUEUR, Guerrilla
18-22 (1976).
'Lieber Instructions, D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN supra note 1, Art. 82, at 14. While some of these groups
may have been patriotic Southerners resisting Union invaders, others were marauders and bandits exploiting
the opportunities afforded by the disruption of war for plunder. Although they might have been tried and
punished, for their individual crimes, it was easier to punish them for their lack of status as "belligerents" -
in the words of Art. 82: ". . . treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates" The preference for avoiding
the necessity of proving individual guilt in the case of guerrilla members of groups which violate the norms
of the law of conflict is still to be noted in the criticisms of the relaxation in the standards for entitlement to
PW status. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 129. Those who make this argument seem to have overlooked Art.
33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which provides that
"lnlo protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collec-
tive penalties and likewise measures of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited."
A person denied prisoner of war status is usually a civilian who is a 'protected person.'
Fall, !19861
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tions.
The critical provisions of the Russian Draft35 were:
That the rights of belligerents shall not only be enjoyed by the Army, but
also by militia and volunteers "who meet the criteria of (1) military com-
mander responsible for his subordinates, (2) wearing a distinctive badge
recognizable at a distance, (3) carrying arms openly, and (4) adhering to
the laws and customs of war"; but belligerent groups not complying with
these conditions were to be denied the combatants' privilege and its
members were to be amenable to judicial proceedings.
The "inhabitants of a district not already occupied by the enemy, who
shall take up arms in defense of their country shall be considered as
belligerents, if they respect the laws and customs of war"; but the in-
habitants of an effectively occupied territory were expressly denied such
status and were to be handed over to justice.
Part-time combatants "who at one time take part independently in the op-
erations of war, and at another return to their pacific operations.. ." were
denied the rights of belligerents and were amenable to military justice.
The smaller European States who saw themselves as the potential victims
of aggression and as occupied territories would not accept the negative provi-
sions which attempted "to confine war to the regular forces of the belligerents
.. ." or to "support any clause which has a tendency either to weaken national
defense or to detach citizens from their duty towards their country." Their
firm opposition forced the deletion of the three negative proposals which
would have explicitly provided that failure to meet the four criteria for
privileged belligerence would render the irregular combatant liable to judicial
action, the denial of privileged combatant status to spontaneous resistance
fighters in occupied territory as well as the provision which outlawed the part-
time combatant.
A declaration made by Italy and supported by the other small states inter-
preted the four conditions for undoubted belligerent status as not necessarily
excluding others participating in national defense, but no specific text to that
effect was adopted.
Twenty-five years later, the same issues nearly caused the failure of the
1899 Hague Regulations. The compromise solution was a reaffirmation of the
relevant provisions of the 1874 Brussels Project in Articles 1 and 2 of the 1899
Hague Regulations with a clause in the preamble to the Convention that Arti-
cles 1 and 2 of the Regulations must be understood in the sense of the famous
35Draft Project, The Brussels Conference of 1874, summarized in Mallison and Jabri, The Juridical
Characteristics of Belligerent Occupation and the Resort to Resistance by the Civilian Population. 42 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 196-200 (1974).
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Martens clause "that in cases not included in the Regulations the population
and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of
the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized
nations, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience. "36
In 1907, the requirement that arms be carried openly was added to the
conditions applicable to civilians who take up arms to resist invaders in unoc-
cupied territory.37
This qualification for combatant status and entitlement to prisoner of war
status in the spontaneous resistance against an invader remains firm law as
reflected in Article 4A(6) of the 1949 Third Convention. It virtually abolishes
the distinction between peaceful civilians and the unorganized patriots during
the invasion stage of an armed conflict until a stabilized occupation is
established by the invader."8
The history of the development of treaty law on the qualification of
privileged combatants show that the political considerations have always
played an important part.39
THE CURRENT LAW
The state of the relevant law of the Articles I and 2 of the 1899 and 1907
Hague Regulations relevant to irregular combatants not formally integrated
into the armed forces of a party to the conflict was that they were privileged
combatants and entitled to be prisoners of war provided that they are orga-
nized and meet the four conditions.
It was clearly understood that compliance with these conditions would
give privileged combatant status to those irregular combatants operating in oc-
cupied territory or elsewhere. Noncompliance was not a violation of the laws
3 Id. at 203-204; D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 1, at 64. In explaining the compromise proposal, Mr.
deMartens stated that the proposed readoption of Brussels Declaration provisions expressly extending
privileged combatants status to those inhabitants who fight against the occupant in conformity with the
stipulated requirements, could be taken neither to deny "the right of [the] population to defend themselves
except when in compliance with these articles, nor to imply that partisans not specifically covered therein
were to be placed outside the protection of international law."
1907 Hague Regulation, Art. 2, D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN supra note 1, at 69.
3'1899 and 1907, Hague Regulations, Article 42, Id. at 82. "Territory is considered occupied when it is ac-
tually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be exercised."
"Violations of the terms of an armistice by individuals was traditionally considered to be a serious war crime
for which punishment might be demanded. (1907 HR Art. 41) After the German government surrendered
unconditionally in 1945, the U.S. tried certain German Nationals for continuing to participate in the war ef-
fort of Japan (Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Notwithstanding this well established principle,
the desire to legitimize the role of General DeGaulle and the Free French who continued to fight on the side
of the Allies after the government of France surrendered in 1940, motivated the 1949 Diplomatic Con-
ference to adopt Article 4A(3) which provided for prisoner of war status for "Imlembers of regular armed
forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power." Note
the similarity to Protocol 1. Art 43(l).
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of war, but in the absence of a contrary rule, the hostile party was not obliged
to recognize a captive irregular's immunity from prosecution and punishment
for warlike acts which do not violate the laws and customs of war. Accord-
ingly, the captor state could try and punish such irregulars under its municipal
law for unprivileged belligerency and for any crime resulting from an un-
privileged warlike act.1
But violations of the laws and customs of war are war crimes, whether
committed by a privileged or unprivileged combatant. Among the war crimes
relevant to this study is "treacherous" killing or wounding of individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army."' Use of civilian disguise in order to
achieve surprise in a situation such as the one described by Mr. Feith involving
a ". . . man with the bomb who is a civilian in all outward appearances but can
blow you to smithereens as you pass him by .. .-"4 would certainly be a
treacherous killing in violation of Hague Regulation, Article 23b. 3
In the 1949 Diplomatic Convention, the compromise ultimately adopted
amounted to a reaffirmation of the 1907 Hague Regulations, clarified by ex-
plicit recognition that the independent militia, volunteer corps or organized
resistance movements be organized and belong to a Party to the conflict."
Although a proposal for an explicit provision that the requirement for a
fixed distinctive sign, recognizable at a distance be worn at all times was not
adopted, it was nevertheless understood that it must be worn constantly in all
circumstances. 4 This requirement was, of course, incompatible with privileged
combatant status for part-time combatants. Realization of the inadequacy of
these provisions to provide privileged combatant status for those who fight
regular military forces in colonial wars, occupied territory and in struggles for
self-determination, gave rise to strong initiatives to relax or abolish the 1949
convention standards for "freedom fighters," frequently coupled with
measures to release them from an obligation to comply with the law of armed
conflict in their relation with unjust oppressors.4 6 Western states generally op-
posed these initiatives in U.N. Forums, but West European states who had ex-
4'Baxter, supra note 30; Solf & Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES J. INT'L L. 205, 215-216 (1977).
' 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 23b, supra note 1, at 76.
42Feith, supra note 12, at 43.
4 
It would also be a "perfidious killing" made punishable as a violation of Article 37(l) of Protocol 1, which
lists "the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status" as an act of perfidy. Failure to comply with the
minimum standards of Article 44(3) would support a charge of perfidy (Protocol I, Article 44(3)).
"Third Geneva Convention, Article 4A(2).
4 ICRC. Commentary Third Geneva Convention J. Pictet, ed.) 55-56 (1960) [hereinafter referred to as
Pictet Commentary, Third Convention].
"See UNGA Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) 12 Dec. 1973. Basic Principles of the Legal Status of Combatants
Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes; Proposals by the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam for the Revision of Drafts Protocol I, CDDH/41, 12 March 1974, IV Official Records,
Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law 177 (1977). The DRV paper was so brazen that it received
only lip service support from the Soviets and other Third World Delegations; it was virtually ignored.
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perienced Axis occupation during World War II or considered that they might
again be subject to occupation, strove for some relaxation of the standard for
resistance movement in occupied territory."7
The purpose of the rigid requirement for the fixed sign and the obligation
to carry arms openly at all times was to:
(a) Preclude irregular combatants from using a civilian disguise to achieve
surprise against their adversary, and
(b) To promote the security of civilians against the effects of hostilities.
Thus, in theory, the rules promote the principle of distinction between
combatants and civilians which is an essential corollary of the rule that the ci-
vilian population and individual civilians may not be the object of attack. But,
in the course of the negotiations, it became apparent to many Western Delega-
tions that resistance movements and "freedom fighters" in territories effective-
ly controlled by their adversaries could not comply with that standard. As Mr.
Feith points out: "Unless [such a force] has a secure base in a region beyond
the writ of the government it is fighting, wearing uniforms and carrying arms
openly would be suicidal." '48 Since the standards could not be complied with in
such circumstances, they were not complied with. Since the resistance fighters
remained a legitimate target for attack, whether or not they distinguish
themselves, the standard did not really protect the civilian population in those
situations when guerrillas based themselves in a civilian environment and
derived their logistics and intelligence support from the civilian population.
The winds of change were sufficiently strong during the Vietnam conflict
to cause the United States Military Assistance Command and the Republic of
Vietnam to classify as prisoners of war, members of Viet Cong guerrilla units
who are captured while actually engaging in combat or in a belligerent act
under arms other than an act of terrorism, sabotage or spying.49
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE
The task of the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference was to arrive at a
balance which would relax the rigid requirements of the Hague and Geneva
Standard sufficiently to provide guerrillas a possibility of attaining privileged
combatant status without exposing the forces fighting them to the danger in-
herent in the use of civilian disguise in order to achieve surprise. The achieve-
ment of such a balance and reconciliation of conflicting positions was one of
"See interventions of Norway and France, respectively at Annex to CDDH/IiSR33-36; XV Official
Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law 400, 537 (1977). One reason why these views
were not pressed more strongly in 1949 was that the states which had suffered Axis occupation during
World War 11 were then Occupying Powers concerned with the security of their occupying force.
4'Feith, supra, note 2, at 43.
"MACV Directive 381-46 Military Intelligence Combined Screening of Detainees. 27 Dec. 1967. Annex A.
Criteria for Classification and Disposition of Detainees. 62 AM. J. INTL L. 766 (1968). It is noteworthy that
the U.S. Military Assistance Command drew a distinction between guerrillas and terrorists.
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the most difficult and prolonged negotiations of the Conference.
The final result of the negotiations on this subject are embodied in Ar-
ticles 37, 43, and 44 of Protocol I.
PROHIBITION OF PERFIDY
Article 37 reaffirms the explicit prohibition of Hague Regulation, Article
23(b) against the treacherous or perfidious killing or wounding of an adversary,
and expands that prohibition to include the capture of an adversary by resort
to perfidy. It defines perfidy ° and provides illustrative examples which include
"the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status." This is coordinated with Arti-
cle 44 (which specifies the relaxation of the manner by which irregular com-
batants must distinguish themselves from civilians in order to qualify as
privileged combatants) by a specific provision that acts which comply with the
provision of Article 44(3) would not be considered to be perfidious within the
meaning of Article 37. Conversely the killing, wounding or capture of an
adversary by a combatant who fails to comply with the minimum standards of
Article 44(3) could be prosecuted as a violation of Article 37 as well as any
other offense such failure might involve.
The New Rule of Distinction
The first sentence of paragraph 3 states the basic rule:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the ef-
fects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from
the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or a military
operation preparatory to an attack.
Mr. Feith dismisses this provision as being "merely hortatory."'" The
significance of this sentence should not thus be underestimated.
By providing expressly that the protection of the civilian population is the
value promoted by the rule, it provides direction and guidance for resolving
controversies as to its interpretations in a manner consistent with the purpose
of the rule.
The use of the word "obliged" in this context is highly significant. By
stating that combatants are "obliged" to distinguish themselves, the rule makes
failure to do so on the occasions and at the times specified a breach of the rules
of international law applicable in armed conflict rather than merely a condi-
tion affecting loss of the combatants' privilege and entitlement to prisoners of
war status. Under pre-existing law, failure to distinguish involved no breach of
'
0Article 37(l) defines "perfidy" as: "Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that
he is entitled to, or obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed con-
flict with intent to betray that confidence
"Feith, supra note 2, at 45.
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any positive prohibition of international law52 except to the extent that it might
have involved a treacherous killing or wounding prohibited by Hague Regula-
tion, Article 23(b). But in the absence of the combatants' privilege, the guerrilla
or saboteur was amenable to trial and punishment for his unprivileged
belligerence and also for any crime under domestic law which would be con-
sidered a legitimate act of war if done by a privileged combatant. A fair ques-
tion is, what difference does it make to the guerrilla if his adversaries condemn
him to death as a war criminal or merely as an unprivileged combatant who
has committed common crimes? It must be conceded that, apart from con-
siderations of honor,53 it makes very little difference to the condemned guer-
rilla. Under pre-existing law, the superior who ordered the use of a civilian
disguise, or failed to suppress it committed no offense. Under Article 44(3),
however, failure on the part of superiors and commanders to enforce the new
norm of international law becomes a breach of Articles 86 and 87.
In view of the change, making failure to distinguish oneself at the times
and under the circumstances prescribed an offense under international law and
extending liability up the chain of command, subject to the penal sanctions
prescribed for breaches in Article 129(3) of the Third Convention, and Article
85 (1) of Protocol I, it is difficult to understand how Mr. Feith can declare that
the first sentence of Article 44(3) is "merely hortatory."
The first sentence also puts to rest any residual claim that an irregular
combatant must distinguish himself at all times while on active duty or even at
all times when he is doing his military thing by participating in a military
operation. The requirement is applicable when he is participating in a military
operation preparatory to an attack. Thus, the farmer by day and guerrilla by
night commits no offense and if apprehended, is entitled to be a prisoner of
war. Just how a "military operation preparatory to an attack" is distinguished
from other military operations remains a matter to be determined by the prac-
tice of states."' But such a combatant remains a legitimate target for attack
whether or not he is preparing for an attack, and if a group of such combatants
is based in a town or village and maintain its weapons, logistical supplies and
equipment in that place, the danger of collateral casualties of civilians remains
substantial, subject only to the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks and
"in Ex Part Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942), the'United States Supreme Court indicated that acts such as es-
pionage, sabotage and guerrilla warfare committed by individual combatants not fulfilling the criteria of
Hague Regulations, Article I, were war crimes in a broad sense. The common understanding after the war,
however, has reflected the contrary views expressed by Professor Baxter in 1951 (supra note 30) which was
later adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council [Mohammed Ali and another v. Public Pros-
ecutor [19691 A.C. 430, 451,453-54 (P.C. Malaysia 1968); See also J. STONE, LEGALCONTROLSOF INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFLICT 549 (1954), where the author comments "such unprivileged belligerents, though not con-
demned by international law, are not protected by it, but are left to the discretion of the belligerent threat-
ened by these activities."
"Would Nathan Hale still be a national hero had he been condemned by the British for poisoning the British
commander?
-"In this connection the provisions of Article 46(3) pertaining to the resident combatant who gathers in-
telligence without any deceptive means other than his appearance as a civilian appear to be relevant.
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the rule of proportionality."5 This danger, however, is equally present under the
Hague rules. Thus, although Article 44(3) of the new rule does not do much to
enhance the protection of civilians from collateral casualties resulting from
bombardment of military objectives situated in towns and villages, Articles
51(5) and 57(2) require substantial care in targeting only separate military ob-
jective (rather than the whole town) and avoiding attacks which may be ex-
pected to cause collateral civilian casualties excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack on military ob-
jectives. These precautions should, as a minimum, ensure that the new rules do
not enhance the dangers prevalent under the Hague rules.
THE CONTROVERSIAL SECOND SENTENCE
The most controversial issue which confronted the Diplomatic Con-
ference, and which most troubles Mr. Feith is the second sentence of
paragraph 3.
As a part of the compromise accommodation to the problems confronting
organized resistance movements in effectively occupied territories and to
liberation movements engaged in armed conflict against a colonial power
without, however, exposing their adversary to the danger that guerrillas might
use civilian disguise to achieve a perfidious surprise, the second sentence of
paragraph 3 relaxes the requirements of the basic rule in situations "where, ow-
ing to the nature of the hostilities, an armed combatant cannot so distinguish
himself, provided that in such situations he carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged
in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in
which he is to participate."
Combatants who, under these specified circumstances, comply with the stan-
dard described in the second sentence continue to enjoy the combatant's
privilege and immunity from prosecution for lawful acts of war, but they are
not relieved of liability for the new offense established under the first sentence.
In this connection, the Report of Committee III noted:
With one narrow exception, the Article makes the sanction for failure by
a guerrilla to distinguish himself, when required to do so to be merely trial
and punishment for violations of the law of war, not loss of combatant or
prisoner of war status. 6
The report of the Committee and numerous declarations by delegations ex-
press the understanding that the situations described in the second sentence of
Article 44(3) are very exceptional and can exist only in occupied territory and
"See Protocol 1, supra note I, Articles 51(4) and (5), and 57(2).
1
6CDDH/407IRev. i, para 19, XV Official Records, supra note 47, at 453.
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in conflicts described in Article 1 (4).S7
Whether the second sentence meets minimum expectation of a conven-
tional armed force that it does not legitimize the use of civilian disguise to
achieve surprise in an attack, depend on the construction of the word "deploy-
ment." The word has many different meanings in military usage and is admit-
tedly ambiguous. In this connection the Report of the Committee states -
The one question of which the explanation of vote revealed a clear dif-
ference of opinion was the meaning of the term "deployment."
Most delegations stated that they understood it as meaning any move-
ment toward a place from which an attack was to be launched." Other delega-
tions stated that it included only a final movement to a firing position.5 9 Quatar
and the PLO (which had no vote to explain), stated that they understood it as
covering only moments immediately prior to attack. ° This seems to be the in-
terpretation on which Mr. Feith and the Secretary of Defense rely.
Construing the phrase in the light of the object of the rule, namely, the
protection of the civilian population, the understandings expressed by Western
delegations is undoubtedly correct.6'
From a technical legal point of view, the declarations expressed by the
U.K., the U.S. would limit their obligations under paragraph 3 of Article 44 if
expressed in an instrument of ratification and would amount of reservations."
They would thus limit the obligation of the reserving states to accord prisoner
of war status only to those hostile guerrillas who distinguish themselves by car-
rying arms openly in their tactical movement toward the place from which the
attack is to be launched. If engaged in an armed conflict, it would be expected
that the declaring states would act in accordance with their declaration. Any
declaration of states expressing a lesser interpretation of "deployment" could
not increase the obligations of any other state and would mean only that those
'XV Official Records, 157(UK), 164(Australia), 170(Greece), 172(France), 176(Canada), 179(US), 186(New
Zealand); VI Official Records (Plenary Session), 127(Greece), 132(UK), 135(France), 150(US), 152(Japan).
"Declaration in Committee: Australia, Canada, FRG, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, UK, USA
(CDDH/III/SR55 and 56); XV Official Records 157, 162, 165, 167, 171, 176, 179; Additional Declarations
in Plenary, Italy, Japan, VI Official Records, 123, 152. The U.S. and the U.K. expressed this declaration at
the time they signed Protocol I, supra note 13; Korea, Belgium and Italy expressed the declaration in their
instrument of ratification supra note 16. Italy omitted reference to Article 1(4) perhaps in the well founded
belief that Article 1(4) could never be implemented.
"Declaration in Committee: Egypt, Sweden, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (CDDH/III/SR 53, 55, 56),
XV Official Records 138, 160, 174; Additional Declaration in Plenary, United Arab Emirates, VI Official
Records 146.
6"Committee: PLO (CDDH/III/SR 53; XV Official Records 183-84); Plenary; Quatar (VI Official Records
149).
61Supra, note 31 and accompanying text.
Q2Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 1 (d) defines "reservation" to mean "a unilateral state-
ment, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying ... or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica-
tion to that State."
Fall, 19861
17
Solf: A Response to Douglas J. Feith
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1987
AKRON LAW REVIEW
states intend to treat the guerrilla fighters of their enemies more generously. 3
Of course, as the effect of a reservation is reciprocal, they would be free to
operate under their adversaries reservation. This would soon establish the
prevailing practice, and thus maintain a safeguard against legitimizing the use
of civilian disguise as a means of achieving surprise and the disastrous conse-
quences to civilians envisioned by Mr. Feith.
Instead of supporting the interpretation of the PLO, Mr. Feith should be
exerting his talent and energy to urge those states who will ratify the Protocol
to express an appropriate declaration regarding the word "deployment."6
EFFECTS OF FORFEITURE OF COMBATANT STATUS
Mr. Feith dismisses the expectations of those who considered the relaxa-
tion of the Hague standards as providing guerrillas an incentive to comply with
the laws of armed conflict with the assertion that the Protocol provides no ef-
fective sanction for non-compliance because paragraph 4 provides that even in
this case the guerrilla shall "be given protection equivalent in all respects to
those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and this
Protocol.'65 This reflects a misunderstanding of the legal effects of the
forfeiture of the combatants' privilege and prisoner of war status.
Having forfeited his combatant status such a prisoner forfeits his entitle-
ment to prisoner of war status. He can therefore be prosecuted for acts, which
if committed by someone who retains privileged combatant status, would be a
lawful act of combat. With respect to his treatment in captivity, however, he
must be given protection equivalent in all respects to those accorded to
Prisoners of war by the Third Convention and the Protocol, including all
judicial safeguards.
A prisoner of war has no immunity from prosecution for breaches of the
law of armed conflict. As one of the most important protections of prisoner of
war status is immunity from punishments under municipal law for acts of
violence not prohibited by international law," the question may arise whether
"equivalent protection" includes the same immunity. It is clear that the Con-
ference did not intend such a result.6 7 In the Third Convention respect for the
combatants' privilege is implemented through Article 87 which provides that
6
3C. Pilloud, Reservations to the Geneva Convention of 1949. 16 INTL REV. RED CROSS 107, 129-30 (1976).
6'See the Belgian, Italian and Korean declarations made at the time of their ratification, supra note 16.
6'Feith, supra note 1, at 46.
"Third Convention Articles 85, 87, 99(1).
"The Committee Report states: ". . . In that extreme case, but in that case only, the sanction for failure to
comply with the requirement of distinction is that the individual may be tried and punished for any crimes
he has committed as a belligerent without privileges. Even then he must be given treatment in captivity
equivalent in all respects to that to which prisoners of war are entitled (CDDH/407/Rev 1, Para 19, XV Of-
ficial Records 453; See also CDDHISR 40, Paras. 26, 48, 52, 74; SR 41 Para 22; VI Official Records 123,
127, 128, 132, and 145 for declarations of delegates expressing the same conclusion.
[Vol. 20:2
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss2/3
A RESPONSE TO DOUGLASJ. FEITH
Prisoners of War may not be sentenced to any penalties except those provided
for members of the Detaining Power's armed forces who have committed the
same act. As failure to distinguish oneself is now a breach of the Protocol, the
Detaining Power is under a duty to suppress or repress such conduct on the
part of its own personnel. As the combatants' privilege has been forfeited, acts
of violence committed are not privileged. Therefore, equivalent protection
does not give immunity under Article 87 as to acts of violence which would
have been privileged if committed by a privileged combatant.
Thus, the killing or wounding of an enemy combatant in a fire fight, or
the burning of an object which is a military objective or even the capture of an
enemy combatant could properly be charged as murder, infliction of grievous
bodily harm, arson or kidnapping under the municipal law of the Detaining
Power.
As there is no doubt that even a prisoner of war remains amenable for pre-
capture breaches of the law of armed conflict, the unprivileged combatant is
clearly amendable for all such breaches. In particular, the serious offense of
perfidious killing, wounding or capturing of an enemy in violation of Article
37 of Protocol I or 1907 Hague Regulation, Article 23(b) ought always to
hover over the guerrilla as a powerful deterrent against violating the minimum
standard. 8
Applying the foregoing rules to the traumatic terrorist car bombings in
Lebanon, if set in the context of an international armed conflict with Protocol
I in effect,
(a) The car bombing of the Marine Barracks would have been perfidious
killings, and,
(b) The two car bombings of the Embassy would have been the grave
breach of causing death or serious bodily injury by making civilians the object
of attack denounced under Article 85 (3)(a). Grave breaches are universal
crimes subject to the obligation of all parties to prosecute or extradite the of-
fenders, who, in this case would be those who organized or ordered the car
bombing attacks.
"But cf. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 901, 915 (1986) where the author construes
the provision of Protocol I, Art 44(3) that "acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall
not be considered as perfidious" - might apply to "feigning protected status prior to a military engagement
by using signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations, or nations that are not parties to the conflict."
One might expect an ingenious, but desperate defense counsel to make such a claim. If Judge Sofaer were
presiding over the trial in such a case, however, he would undoubtedly rule, as a matter of law, that the
unlawful deception inherent in pretending to be an armed but protected U.N. peacekeeper is in no way ex-
cused by the provision of Article 44 (3), which is relevant only to the pretense of being an unarmed civilian
about to engage in an armed attack. Moreover, the unauthorized use of the distinctive emblems of the U.N.
or the use of the insignia of states not parties to the conflict need not be charged as perfidy in violation of Ar-
ticle 37; they are separate offenses laid under Articles 38(2) and 39(1). Terrorists would not be wise to follow
Judge Sofaer's suggestion or to apply its reasoning to the pretense of being medical personnel armed with
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As the United States and Libya were recently engaged in an international
armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2 common to the Geneva Con-
ventions, 9 and as Libya is a party to Protocol I, the bombing of the Berlin
discotheque meets the criteria of the grave breaches denounced by Article 85
(3)(b) as an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population in the
knowledge that such attacks would cause excessive loss of life or injury to
civilians.70 If the United States were a Party to Protocol I and if it had enacted
the necessary legislation to implement the provisions regarding grave breaches,
it would now be in a position to request the extradition of any terrorist in-
volved in the bombing and of any Libyan authorities involved in the ordering
or execution of the attack from any of the 59 parties to the Protocol in whose
territory the offenders might be found.7'
If avoiding the penal sanctions available under the law are not incentives
to retain the combatants' privilege and to avoid breaches, one need only blame
those governments which fail to avail themselves of the law enforcement
means available, and mandated under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Pro-
tocol I.
WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"
In the highly politicized first session of the diplomatic conference, the on-
ly significant substantive work done was the adoption of Article 1, by Commit-
tee I of the Conference which provided in part that the international armed
conflicts to which the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I apply, would
also apply to a severely limited class of:
... armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domina-
tion and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of
their right of self determination, as enshrined in the [U.N.] charter ....
and the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter ... 7
"gSee ICRC Commentary III Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, J. Pictet (ed) 23
(1960).
'
0As there was no conceivable military advantage to be obtained from the terrorist act of bombing the Berlin
discotheque, even a single civilian casualty would be excessive.
"Common Articles 49/50/129/146 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; Protocol I, Art 85(1). A draft of such
legislation prepared by the Department of Defense Law of War Working Group in May 1979 was forwarded
to the State Department for interagency coordination by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (1-5340/79).
"The present author is disappointed that the West has not moved vigorously to prevent the Soviets from ap-
propriating the term "Wars of National Liberation," which was used by the Germans to describe their strug-
gle to free themselves from Napoleon's conquest (Befreiungs Krieg) and which could justly be used to
categorize the American Revolution, Simon Bolivar's revolt of the Central and South American colonies
and which had been used by Carl Schurz in referring to the war against Spain over Cuba (See W. SAFME,
THE NEW LANGUAGE OF POLiTIcs 478 (1968).
"1R.R. Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on
Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1-26 (1975).
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As Mr. Feith points out, the U.S. Delegation and its friends vigorously op-
posed this provision. First, it injects subjective element as to the justice of par-
ticular causes, a factor which may be within the scope of thejus ad bellum (the
circumstances under which resort to armed force may be justified), but which
should not find a place in humanitarian law which is limited to the neutral jus
in bello applicable to all parties to the conflict without regard to the justice of
their cause.
Secondly, based on the rhetoric of some of the proponents, and the
language of some UN Resolutions which had touched on the issue, the West
feared that the revival of the just war concept would relieve the "just" side of
the obligation to respect the prohibitions and restraints of humanitarian law.
Thirdly, the selection of certain conflicts only for special treatment would
discriminate against the victims of other conflicts.
Fourthly, non-state parties are not likely to have the resources and capaci-
ty to fulfill the obligations under the Conventions and the Protocol.
The legal argument made in support of the provision was that the
development of international law, as evidenced by many U.N. resolutions and
the practice of numerous states had already elevated certain armed struggles
against colonial domination to the status of international armed conflicts. The
proposed provision merely recognizes a fact already accomplished.74
In 1974 Committee I adopted the provision by a vote of 70 for, 21 against
and 13 abstentions.75
After the 1974 session there was serious consideration within the Defense
and State Departments that the U.S. and many of its allies should not return to
the conference, but on further consideration it began to dawn on those con-
cerned that the provision would have no practical effect. The colonial power
targeted by the provision, Portugal, was in the process of giving up its struggle.
South Africa, Rhodesia and Israel and the other target states would not ratify
or accede to the Protocol 6 and the reference to the U.N. Declaration of
Friendly Relations would afford all other states which might be affected by
dissident or separatist elements with a plausible basis for denying its applica-
tion to their situation."
'
4Protocol 1, supra note 1, Art 1(4) Summarized in BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF. NEW RULES FOR THE VICTIMS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 40-43 (1980).
"CDDHSR13, para 42; VIII Official Records 102.
6Mr. Feith cites the Israeli Representative as stating "[Plrotocol l's national-liberation war provisionl has
within it a built-in non-applicability clause, since a party would have to admit that it was either racist, alien
or colonial ... such language.., ensured that no state by its own volition would ever apply that article."
(Feith, supra note 1, at 40).
"It is necessary to appreciate the dilemma of the Third World proponents of the drive to classify the strug-
gles against Israel, Portuguese Colonialism and Southern Africa as international armed conflicts without
also so classifying the revolt of the Kurds against Iraq, the secession of Biafra from Nigeria and the long
standing revolt of the Eritreans against Ethiopia. The key to their solution lies in the reference in the text of
Article 1(4) to the Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation AmongStates insofar as it deals with
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The U.S. delegation made it clear to the Third World sponsors, that the
U.S. would not remain in the Conference unless the substantive obligations as
well as the rights and benefits of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol ap-
ply equally to all Parties to the conflict. This was accomplished in a pream-
bular clause which reaffirms:
... that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions ... and of this Protocol
must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected
by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature
or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed
to the parties to the conflict.
Moreover, under Article 96(3), the declaration by which a liberation
movement may invoke the Convention, and Protocol I provides that the move-
ment "assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been
assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this Protocol."
The U.S. delegation also made it clear that ". . . we were not prepared to pay a
high price in terms of military effectiveness or political barnacles in order to
obtain treaty provisions that we desired."" After the political delegates from
the Third World Permanent U.N. Missions in Geneva had achieved their red
herring symbolic political victory, they lost interest in the pick and shovel work
of the remaining negotiations. Thus, the really substantive issues were
negotiated by representatives who honestly sought to find practical solutions,
consistent with their country's interest, for the protection of the victims of
war. In this climate it was possible to arrive at reasonable compromises with
which all sides could live. The United States was successful in achieving many
of the provisions we wanted including a better Protecting Power system, great-
ly improved protection for medical aircraft, specific requirements to account
for the missing in action and the dead, a clear statement that prisoners of war
the principle of self determination. This could plausibly immunize them from the legal effects of Article 1(4)
based on the following propositions extracted from the text of the declaration:
a. The territory of a colony or other non-self governing territory has ... a status separate and apart
from the territory administering it. (This established sufficiently the international personality
thought to be essential to be a party to an international armed conflict.)
b. .... such status ... shall exist until the people of the colony ... have exercised their right of self
determination.
c. The establishment of a sovereign and independent state; the free association or integration with an
independent state or the emergence into any other status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self determination. (Note that the essential separate status ter-
minates when the people of the colony opt to become a new state or a subdivision of an existing
state).
d. Nothing in the foregoing shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent states ... possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.
e. Every state shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and territorial integrity of any other state or country. [The Principle of Equal Rights and
Self-Determination of Peoples (UNGA resoluted 2625 (XXV)) Declaration of Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations (Oct 24, 1979)].
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could not be denied protection on the ground that they were fighting an ag-
gressive war, more specific rules protecting civilians who could not be classified
as "protected persons" and reasonable clarifications of many ambiguities in the
1907 Hague Regulations on the conduct of hostilities such as a favorable
definition of military objectives, the first definition of the rule of proportionali-
ty and a clear definition of non-defended localities.
The issue which must be faced is whether a theoretical provision relating
to certain armed struggles for self determination which is unlikely to be im-
plemented outweighs the many positive improvements embodied in Protocol I
for strengthening the protection of victims of war.
The following are some of the evils alleged by Mr. Feith as flowing from
Article 1(4) and a short answer as to why they are not as serious as perceived
by him (and by Western Delegations in 1974):
. Allegation: Art 1(4) would legitimize wars of national liberation.
Answer: The preamble of Protocol I expresses the conviction of the par-
ties: "That nothing in this Protocol or in the Geneva Conventions...
shall be construed as legitimizing or authorizing any act of aggression or
any other use of force inconsistent with the charter of the United
Nations."
As a humanitarian instrument, the Protocol could no more legitimize the use
of force to achieve self determination, than Article 2, common to the 1949
Conventions, legitimizes aggression. As a part of thejus in bello the Protocol
lays down rules which must be applied in international armed conflicts without
regard to the justice of the causes espoused by the Parties to the conflict. If the
prevailing international law as to the jus ad bellum considers such conflicts as
international armed conflicts, Art 1(4) provides that the rules of international
armed conflict shall apply. In this regard, Article 4 of Protocol I provides
The application of the Conventions and of this Protocol,... shall not ef-
fect the legal status of the Parties in the conflict. Neither the occupation
of a territory nor the application of the Conventions and this Protocol
shall affect the legal status of the territory in question.
Relevant political instruments which would, if binding, tend to legitimize the
use of force by peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination to achieve self determination and to seek and receive support to
that end are to be found in the Declaration of Friendly Relations79 and in Arti-
cle 7 of the Definition of Aggression:"°
. Allegation: Article 1(4) licenses belligerent foreign meddling in the
"Supra note 77.
"UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) 14 Dec. 1974. Paragraph 7 provides that nothing in the definition of ag-
gression including the list of acts amounting to aggression could prejudice the right of self determinating
freedom or independence of peoples forcibly deprived of that right, particularly peoples under colonial and
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sovereign domain of affected states.
Answer: Covert, publicized covert or relatively open military assistance
from States friendly to dissident groups may be expected to occur without
the blessing of international law in any situation of internal armed con-
flict. There is nothing in the Geneva Convention or in Protocol I relevant
to international armed conflicts which legitimizes military assistance or
military support to either Party in an armed conflict. Support of a strictly
humanitarian nature is encouraged including medical personnel and
units,8' relief" and civil defense units. 3 But in each such case the adverse
Party must be notified in advance, and free passage of relief requires the
consent of the Parties concerned."
. Allegation: In the absence of an objective standard for judging whether
a group qualifies as a liberation movement under Article 1(4), "any
separatist band of armed criminals might claim to be engaged in an armed
struggle in furtherance of the right to self determination."
Answer: Article 1(4) limits its scope to "peoples," and the Declaration of
Friendly Relations limits it further to the "peoples of a colony or non-self
governing territory." Entities which do not qualify as the people of a par-
ticular territory, such as minorities or groups of political opponents simply
do not qualify.
. . Allegation: Based on the manner used to determine what liberation
movements would be invited to attend the diplomatic conference as
observers, the power to determine which movement qualifies will be
vested in the regional intergovernmental organizations such as the Arab
League and the Organization of African Unity.
Answer: The Protocol makes no provision as to any authority to make
this determination. Accordingly, the affected State is the ultimate decision
maker. In signing the Protocol, the United Kingdom expressed an
understanding that a liberation movement could not qualify as a party to
an international armed conflict unless it was recognized by the ap-
propriate regional intergovernmental organization. 5 The expectation of
the UK, undoubtedly, was that the Council of Europe would not be likely
to recognize the PIRA as qualifying under Article 1(4). During the
diplomatic conference various Arab, African, Latin American and
Southeast Asian States made similar declarations, ostensibly in the expec-
tation that their regional organization is unlikely to recognize their dissi-
dent groups as qualifying, thus affording an additional layer of immunity
against the effects of Art. 1(4) in relation to dissident movements within
"First Convention, Art 27; Second Convention, Art 25, 38; Protocol I Arts. 9(2), 22(2).
2Fourth Conv. Arts 23, 59-62, 109-111; Protocol I, Arts 70-71.
1
3Supra, note 1, Protocol I, Art 64.
S4Supra notes 81-83.
I'D. SCHINDLER AND J. TOMAN supra, note 1, at 635.
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their territory. In view of the foregoing, it follows that the self determina-
tion provision in Art. 1(4) is largely symbolic and is not at all likely to pre-
sent any practical problems in operations except that it automatically ex-
cludes Israel and South Africa from becoming parties to the Protocol, an
unfortunate consequence in view of the military capability of both states
in relation to their neighbors.
THE 1979 CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES
Despite the presence of the same offensive language in Article 12 of the
1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 6 the United
States ratified the Hostage Convention in December 1984, considering it to be
an effective tool to combat hostage taking as an act of international terrorism
because it:
... imposes binding legal obligations upon States Parties either to submit
to prosecution or to extradite any person within their jurisdiction who
commits acts of hostage taking,... attempts to commit such an act, or
participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits ... such an act.87
Article 12 of The Treaty is unique in that it coordinates its own applica-
tion with that of the norms of the Geneva Conventions and its additional Pro-
tocols by providing a means for international enforcement of the norms of the
Geneva Conventions prohibiting hostage taking even when the Geneva Con-
vention system provides no such international enforcement means.
Under the Geneva Convention and the 1977 Protocols, there are prohibi-
tions against hostage taking in non-international armed conflicts8 and in inter-
national armed conflicts with respect to civilians who are "protected
persons,"89 and civilians who are not protected persons."° Only the hostage tak-
ing of "protected" civilians in an international armed conflict, however, is a
"grave breach" and thus a universal crime subject to the mandatory obligation
to submit to prosecution or to extradite. 9'
By virtue of Article 12 of the Hostage Convention, the strong obligation
to prosecute or extradite is somewhat elliptically made applicable to any hos-
tage taking prohibited under the Geneva Conventions or its Protocols when-
ever the obligations to prosecute or to extradite under these treaties are not ap-
plicable. Where the obligation to prosecute or extradite exists under the Gene-
va Convention system, the Hostage Convention is not applicable. Thus, the
"Internation Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, signed Dec. 21, 1979; ratified by U.S. Dec. 7,
1984, UST - TIAS, _.
"Letter of transmittal, Aug. 4, 1980, Message from the President, Senate Document Executive N, 96th Con-
gr. 2d Session., p. iii.
"Art. 3, Common to the Conventions, supra note 8; Protocol I1, Art 4(2) supra note 1.
"Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 8, Arts. 34, and 147.
"Protocol 1, supra note 1, Art, 75(2)(c).
"Supra note 89, Art 147.
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two regimes complement each other and cover almost every hostage taking sit-
uation.
In 1979, Ambassador Anthony Quainton, Director of the State Depart-
ment's Office for Combating Terrorism considered Art 1(4) of Protocol I to be
a positive development because it extended the grave breaches regime of inter-
national armed conflicts to wars of national liberation and thus facilitated the
obligation to prosecute or extradite.92
The negotiating history of the Hostage Convention began in a setting as
traumatic as that outlined by Mr. Feith with respect to Article 1(4) of Protocol
I. Third World delegates demanded that Liberation Movement hostage taking
be removed from the scope of the Hostage Convention, that only the taking of
"innocent" hostages should be proscribed, that "guilty" persons such as Ian
Smith should not be protected, and that political motivation should not only
bar extradition, but also excuse the act.93
By careful and patient negotiation and Western willingness to accept the
symbolism of wars of liberation formula, the provision was turned around to
exclude from the scope of the Hostage Convention those hostage takings to
which the Geneva Convention or either Protocol is applicable and under
which states parties were bound to prosecute or extradite the offender. All
other hostage taking prohibited under the Conventions and Protocols fall
within the scope of the Hostage Convention.94
A question remains as to why the present administration was eager to
ratify the Hostage Convention despite its use of the offensive wars of libera-
tion clauses, because that Convention was perceived to facilitate the prosecu-
tion or extradition of terrorists who take hostages,95 while it gasps over the
identical language in Protocol I, which would facilitate the prosecution or ex-
tradition of terrorists committing a broader spectrum of terrorist acts?
CONCLUSION
In announcing its decision not to ratify Protocol I, based primarily on its
objection to the provisions applying the humanitarian rules of international
armed conflict to certain very limited struggles by peoples for self determina-
92Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
420-21 (1980).
3Verwey, The International Hostages Convention and National Liberation Movements, 75 AM. J. INTL L.
69, 70-76 (1981).
94Supra, note 86. Art 12.
"Sofaer, supra note 68 at 915-917. While deploring the rhetorical and symbolic effect of the wars of libera-
tion clause, the present legal adviser of the State Department refers to the Hostage Convention as
establishing "a useful scheme for combating hostage taking by terrorists..." He suggests, however, that Ar-
ticle 12 "requires, in specified circumstances, that persons like Abu Abbas must be treated as wayward
soldiers, rather than as international criminals." Apparently, he has overlooked the point that under Pro-
tocol I (art. 85(5)), persons who commit grave breaches are "war criminals."
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tion and changed standards which facilitate the capability for irregular com-
batants to qualify for the combatants' privilege and entitlement to be prisoners
of war the administration notes: "that certain provisions of Protocol I reflect
customary international law, and others appear to be positive developments."
The administration, therefore, intends "to propose to our Allies and others a
common understanding or declaration of principles incorporating these
aspects, with the intention of securing their recognition as customary interna-
tional law .- "96
The administration states that Protocol I "suffered from fundamental
shortcomings that could not be remedied through reservations and under-
standings."97
If those fundamental shortcomings are the two provisions most vigorous-
ly emphasized by Mr. Feith, their effect is seriously exaggerated.
The Wars of National Liberation provision of Article 1(4) is, for all prac-
tical purposes, a dead letter. It will never be implemented in practice; Israel and
South Africa will not accede to Protocol I, and other states will never admit
that "colonial domination, and alien occupation and racist regimes" are ap-
plicable to their situation.
The principal fear of Western States in the first session of 1974-1977 was
that this provision might generate a version of the "just war" doctrine whereby
the "just" side was relieved of the restraints imposed by the law of war on the
parties to the conflict. After the politicized first session, Article 1(4) was at-
tenuated by preambular provision that nothing in the Protocol can be con-
strued to legitimize or authorize any aggression or other use of force inconsis-
tent with U.N. Chapter; and that the Conventions and Protocol I must be fully
applied to all persons protected by them without any adverse distinction based
on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the cause espoused by or at-
tributed to the Parties to the conflict. It was further attenuated by Article 96(3)
which provides that, in order to make the Conventions and Protocol I ap-
plicable in a qualified struggle for self determination against a Party to Pro-
tocol I, the liberation movement must assume the same rights and obligations
which have been assumed by the movement's adversary. If, as Mr. Feith
believes, Liberation Movements generally practice terrorism, few if any would
wish to assume these obligations.
In view of all of the circumstances, Article 1(4) has only rhetorical and
symbolic significance, the risk of which the present administration did not
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Because they are likely to be implemented with respect to resistance
movements in occupied territory during future interstate armed conflicts, the
new rules relevant to the conditions under which guerrillas may qualify for the
combatants' privilege are of much greater practical significance.
Under the new rules members of the regular armed forces and other
organized armed groups of a Party to the conflict in an International Armed
Conflict are privileged combatants if they are under a command responsible to
that Party for the conduct of its subordinates. Like the Free French of World
War II, it does not matter whether that Party is represented by a Government
or authority recognized by the adverse Party.99
All members of such armed forces are entitled to be prisoners of war, and
although they may be tried and punished for any violation of the law of armed
conflict, they do not lose their combatants' privilege or entitlement to be
prisoners of war unless they fail to meet the minimum standard authorized for
exceptional circumstances in the second paragraph of Art. 44(3)100
This rule was strongly supported by the U.S. government in order to pre-
vent repetition of our unfortunate experience in the Korean and Vietnamese
conflicts when captured U.S. personnel were denied treatment required for
prisoners of war on the allegation that the armed force to which they belonged
had committed war crimes or that their participation in an aggressive war
made them guilty of a crime against peace.
In summary, the new rules of Article 44 legitimize part time combatants,
and relax the standards for distinguishing guerrillas from peaceful civilians suf-
ficiently to make it possible for guerrillas to retain the combatants privilege
and thus avoid prosecution and punishment for legitimate acts of war. (But not
for breaches of that law). It requires sufficient distinction, however, to protect
the adversary from the use of civilian disguise to effect surprise.
Under the old rule, failure to meet any of the rigid standards resulted in
loss of the combatants privilege and consequent liability, under the domestic
law of the captor, for unprivileged belligerence and all violent acts whether or
not such acts would have been legitimate acts of war if done by a privileged
combatant. This provided no incentive for compliance with the law of armed
conflict. On the other hand, the retention of the privilege coupled with the
danger of penal sanctions for violations would seem to provide a powerful in-
"Supra note 1, Art 43(1) Protocol 1.
10Id. Art 44 (1)(2)(3); cf. Third 1949 Convention, Art. 85 which repudiated World War II practice by pro-
viding that: "[Plrisoners of war prosecuted under The Law of The Detaining Power for acts committed prior
to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present convention." Although the Soviet Union
and all other Communist states interposed reservations to the effect that prisoners of war convicted, in ac-
cordance with the principles of The Nuremberg Trial, of war crimes and crimes against humanity, will be
subject to the conditions for those undergoing punishment for such crimes. That reservation requires that,
until the conviction is final, the accused retains his status as a PW. The reaffirmation of Art 85 in Protocol I,
Art 44(a) will make it more difficult for Communist states to deny PW status to captured combatants on
such grounds as North Vietnam advanced during the Vietnam conflict.
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centive for complying with the law of armed conflict.
There are a number of ambiguities in Paragraph 3 of Article 44, which
might result in the failure to provide the indispensible prerequisite for accept-
ability of the new rule: the prevention of the use of civilian disguise to achieve
surprise. Most of these ambiguities, including the meaning of the critical word
"deployment" have been corrected by formal understanding expressed by
states at the time of signature or ratification. It might be well to formulate an
understanding as to what is meant by "a military operation preparatory to an
attack" and how that is distinguished from other "military operations" in
which irregular combatants are not obliged to distinguish themselves.
On balance it would seem that the provisions vehemently attacked by Mr.
Feith do not warrant rejection of the Protocol. When these issues are viewed
in their proper perspective, the remaining question will be: What other provi-
sions for the protection of civilians are deemed to be unacceptable by the ad-
ministration and why they are so deemed? The debate on these matters should
be enlightening.
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